Making Amends: Amending the ICSID Convention to Reconcile Competing Interests in International Investment Law by Supnik, Kate M.
SUPNIK IN FINAL 11/1/2009 8:53:48 PM 
 
 
MAKING AMENDS: AMENDING THE ICSID 
CONVENTION TO RECONCILE COMPETING 
INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW 
KATE M. SUPNIK† 
ABSTRACT 
  Globalization has increased international investment activity, but 
no unified legal framework governs international investments. After 
several attempts to establish a multilateral investment framework, 
prospective parties remain unable to reach a consensus on a viable 
system to address investor and state rights. Developed, capital-
exporting states wish to protect their citizens’ investments, whereas 
developing states simultaneously seek to attract investments and 
maintain regulatory autonomy. 
  In the absence of a comprehensive agreement, bilateral investment 
treaties serve as the primary legal instruments setting forth the terms 
of cross-border investments. These treaties often grant private 
investors the right to file claims before the International Centre for the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). ICSID cases sometimes 
raise questions that mirror the competing interests of developed and 
developing states that surface during multilateral investment treaty 
negotiations. 
  Amending the ICSID Convention to include a provision allowing 
tribunals to consider environmental, public health, and labor 
concerns would serve as a positive step toward establishing an 
investment regime that maximizes the interests of investors and host 
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states alike. This scheme would better address state interests, enhance 
ICSID’s legitimacy, and increase the likelihood of future, successful 
negotiations to establish a workable and comprehensive multilateral 
investment framework. 
INTRODUCTION 
Suppose a Spanish company invests in a hotel and resort 
community in Egypt that will welcome foreign visitors and stimulate 
the Egyptian economy by attracting international industry-specific 
organizations for major conferences. The company satisfies all 
government regulations and obtains the requisite permits. Relying on 
the Egyptian government’s approval, the Spanish company invests 
millions of dollars to construct a lavish property. Months after the 
company opens the resort’s doors but prior to recouping its 
investment, the Egyptian government enacts discriminatory 
regulations that thwart the hotel’s business objectives. The measures 
require foreign-owned hotel properties to refrain from hosting 
conferences and to pay a 25 percent assessment on all revenues to 
fund domestic research projects. The regulations appreciably upset 
the Spanish company’s expectations by cutting away from anticipated 
profits while providing a distinct advantage to Egyptian competitors 
that are not subject to the measures. Historically, the Spanish 
company would have had little choice but to turn to Egypt’s domestic 
courts to seek damages on an expropriation claim. Egyptian courts 
would likely favor its government’s measures over the Spanish 
company’s interests. 
International investment law, however, provides alternative 
recourse through binding arbitration, even without a contractual 
arbitration provision. Under Spain and Egypt’s bilateral investment 
treaty (BIT), private investors from one state may bring claims 
against the other state through the International Centre for the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).1 BITs provide ground 
rules for protecting foreign investment, and commentators contend 
they facilitate international commercial transactions.2 ICSID 
arbitration protects cross-border investment by hearing disputes over 
 
 1. Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Egypt-Spain, 
art. 11, ¶ 2, Nov. 3, 1992, 1820 U.N.T.S. 194. 
 2. RUDOLF DOLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 12 
(1995). 
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agreements among sovereign states, including BITs and regional 
trade agreements that address foreign investment. These 
international agreements are at the heart of a number of the 122 
disputes pending before ICSID.3 Some commentators have criticized 
these agreements for being one-sided.4 Unequal bargaining power 
often translates into a developing country’s acceptance of 
international investment agreements on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.5 In 
agreeing to unfavorable BIT terms, a developing state often limits its 
ability to enact regulatory measures contrary to the interests of 
private parties in developed states. 
When capital-importing states enact measures to enhance 
environmental or social conditions within their borders, governments 
may find themselves subject to expropriation claims by foreign 
investors. Although investment protection carries the benefit of 
promoting capital flows and funding poor countries, private investors 
may perceive potential windfalls within strong protection provisions 
and bring claims against states for enacting legitimate regulations that 
promote sustainable development consistent with international 
treaties. The possibility of facing costly lawsuits may discourage 
developing countries from enacting measures to promote 
environmental and social initiatives. This possibility may also render 
states hostile toward ICSID jurisdiction or participation in an 
international investment law regime. 
Attempts to create a comprehensive international investment 
treaty have failed due in large part to a historic discrepancy between 
the interests of developed and developing states.6 New proposals for a 
 
 3. International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, List of Pending Cases, 
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=GenCaseDtlsRH&actionVal=List
Pending (last visited Sept. 28, 2009). See generally LUCY REED, JAN PAULSSON & NIGEL 
BLACKABY, GUIDE TO ICSID ARBITRATION (2004) (providing a procedural overview of ICSID 
arbitration). 
 4. E.g., Joseph E. Stiglitz, Regulating Multinational Corporations: Towards Principles of 
Cross-Border Legal Frameworks in a Globalized World Balancing Rights with Responsibilities, 
23 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 451, 468 (2008). 
 5. See, e.g., Zachary Elkins, Andrew T. Guzman & Beth Simmons, Competing for Capital: 
The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960-2000, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 265, 277 (“Host 
countries, on the other hand, realize that they must compete with other potential hosts, and 
therefore cannot demand changes to the core provisions of the treaties.”). 
 6. See, e.g., Peter Muchlinski, Policy Issues, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 3, 14 (Peter Muchlinski, Federico Ortino & Christoph 
Schreuer eds., 2008) (addressing the need for a balance “between the legitimate interests of 
investors to enjoy their investments in a settled, transparent, and predictable investment policy 
environment and the legitimate interests of the host country to pursue its development goals”). 
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comprehensive multilateral investment agreement would likely 
succumb to the same shortcomings that thwarted previous efforts.7 
Alternative methods of enhancing international investment’s legal 
framework could provide a much needed push toward reconciling 
competing interests.8 Incremental changes to the current international 
investment system incorporating compromise measures would 
provide a forum to test innovations in investment law. It would also 
pave the way for a successful multilateral agreement that accounts for 
the competing interests of developed and developing countries. 
The international trade regime, which, unlike investment law, 
has an institutional backbone through the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), accommodates some state regulatory activity through a series 
of General Exceptions included in the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT),9 the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS),10 and the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment 
Measures (TRIMs).11 In spite of the potential for protectionist market 
effects that run contrary to the WTO’s free trade goals, 12 the General 
Exceptions recognize state regulatory autonomy in areas including 
public health and the environment.13 By providing a safe harbor for 
certain regulatory activities, these provisions have the potential to 
encourage developing states to adopt policies for sustainable 
development and social growth. 
This Note argues that amending the ICSID Convention to 
include a provision allowing arbitral tribunals to consider 
environmental, public health, and labor concerns would constitute a 
positive step toward developing an investment regime that maximizes 
the interests of investors and host states alike. A provision that 
 
 7. See infra Part II. 
 8. See generally Muchlinski, supra note 6, at 10–15 (describing ideological controversies in 
international investment law). 
 9. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XX, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194. 
 10. General Agreement on Trade in Services, art. XIV, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1167. 
 11. Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, art. 3, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1868 U.N.T.S. 186, available 
at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/18-trims.pdf. 
 12. See generally PETER GALLAGHER, THE FIRST TEN YEARS OF THE WTO: 1995–2005 
(2005) (describing WTO activities during its first decade in operation); AUTAR KRISHEN KOUL, 
GUIDE TO THE WTO AND GATT: ECONOMICS, LAW, AND POLITICS (2005) (providing a 
historical overview and analysis of the international trade system). 
 13. Salman Bal, International Free Trade Agreements and Human Rights: Reinterpreting 
Article XX of the GATT, 10 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 62, 69 (2001). 
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enables and encourages ICSID arbitrators to evaluate investor-state 
disputes similar to the General Exceptions set forth in the World 
Trade Organization regime would more adequately address state 
interests, enhance ICSID’s legitimacy, and lead to a workable and 
comprehensive multilateral investment framework. 
Part I presents background on international investment law. 
First, it examines the competing interests that have blocked previous 
attempts to establish a comprehensive, multilateral investment treaty. 
Second, it addresses the novelty of investor-state disputes before 
ICSID and demonstrates why it may be an appropriate forum 
through which to take alternative measures to ultimately enable a 
multilateral investment framework. Part II analyzes the failures of 
previous attempts to create a multilateral investment treaty and 
suggests how these failures should guide future negotiations. Part III 
introduces trade law exemptions, which provide a logical source for a 
provision that seeks to balance interests between states and private 
parties in the investment regime. Finally, Part IV explores the 
potential effectiveness of an ICSID amendment to advance 
international investment law, looking to changes in the international 
investment paradigm as well as the implications of using investment 
treaties grounded in anachronistic assumptions. 
I.  THE INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT SYSTEM 
AND INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTES 
In the absence of a comprehensive international investment 
framework, BITs commonly set forth the terms of cross-border 
investment activity. The rights and obligations that arise from these 
treaties attain their authority through enforcement mechanisms, 
including international arbitration.14 In the international investment 
context, ICSID arbitration provides investors with a right of action 
that compels compliance with the terms of BITs.15 A significant 
amount of international investment law may be characterized through 
the rise of both BITs and investor-state disputes.16 
 
 14. DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 2, at 120–21. 
 15. Joachim Delaney & Daniel Barstow Magraw, Procedural Transparency, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 6, at 721, 726. 
 16. See CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN, LAURENCE SHORE & MATTHEW WEINIGER, 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: SUBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLES 26 (2007) (“BITs 
became viewed as a preferred type of international instrument to regulate the bilateral 
treatment of foreign investments.”). 
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To fully grasp the need for reform in international investment 
law, some background on BITs, investor-state arbitration, and their 
interplay is necessary. Part I.A introduces BITs and Part I.B traces 
the development of ICSID arbitration. Part I.C introduces potential 
challenges to ICSID’s legitimacy, which may be skirted with the 
implementation of an amendment that addresses the interests of 
capital-importing states. 
A.  BITs: The De Facto Building Blocks of International Investment 
Law 
States enter into BITs to promote economic cooperation and 
encourage international investment flows that “stimulate . . . 
economic development.”17 BITs set forth the terms by which host 
states treat international investment and provide dispute resolution 
provisions for potential breaches.18 A capital-exporting state enters 
into a BIT to protect its citizens’ and corporations’ investments in a 
particular country, whereas capital importers provide “an economic 
bill of rights”19 to encourage that investment.20 A capital exporter 
negotiates for limits on a host state’s regulatory autonomy, because it 
represents investors who wish to minimize expenditures.21 
 
 17. E.g., Treaty Between the United States of America and the Government of [Country] 
Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, Feb. 5, 2004, 
available at http://www.bilaterals.org/article.php3?id_article=137 (follow “US draft model BIT” 
hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 16, 2009) [hereinafter 2004 U.S. Model BIT]; Treaty Between the 
United States of America and the Government of the Oriental Republic of Uruguay 
Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S.-Uru., Nov. 4, 
2005, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 109-9 (2006) [hereinafter U.S.-Uruguay BIT]. For a general overview 
of BITs and international investment disputes, see generally DOLZER  & STEVENS, supra note 2. 
 18. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The Economics of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 41 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 469, 470 (2000). 
 19. Susan D. Franck, Integrating Investment Treaty Conflict and Dispute Systems Design, 92 
MINN. L. REV. 161, 172 (2007). 
 20. Id. Common protections within BITs include 
guarantees of appropriate compensation for expropriation, promises of freedom from 
unreasonable or discriminatory measures, guarantees of national treatment for the 
investment, assurances of fair and equitable treatment, promises that investments will 
receive full protection and security, undertakings that a sovereign will honor its 
obligations, and assurances that foreign direct investment . . . will receive treatment 
no less favorable than that accorded under international law. 
Id. 
 21. See Victor Mosoti, Bilateral Investment Treaties and the Possibility of a Multilateral 
Framework on Investment at the WTO: Are Poor Economies Caught in Between?, 26 NW. J. 
INT’L L. & BUS. 95, 98–99 (2005) (“[F]oreign investors do not want their transaction costs to be 
increased by seemingly burdensome requirements beyond the evaluation and entry process.”). 
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Developing countries largely perceive foreign direct investment 
(FDI) as a necessity for economic growth.22 In fact, developing states 
often enact regulations for the very purpose of attracting foreign 
investment.23 Competition to attract available capital exists among 
similarly situated developing states, thereby inducing them to grant 
concessions when negotiating BITs with capital-exporting states as 
well as individual contracts with private investors.24 Free trade 
agreements containing investment provisions operate in a similar 
manner, as do regional trade provisions, notably the investment 
provisions prescribed in Chapter 11 of the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA).25 
Developing countries have historically objected to the principles 
embodied within BITs and other international investment 
agreements.26 This is especially true of Latin American countries that 
subscribed to the Calvo Doctrine’s assertions of sovereignty for much 
of the twentieth century.27 The Calvo Doctrine posits that foreign 
investors are subject to a host government’s legal system and are not 
entitled to enhanced treatment, including external fora for resolving 
disputes.28 By the 1970s, however, developing states felt it necessary 
to attract foreign investment and many proceeded to enter into 
BITs,29 despite their provisions for international dispute resolution. 
 
 22. Id. at 97. 
 23. Id. at 101. 
 24. See id. at 125–26 (“Developing countries have also been willing to sign on to BITs 
providing for compensation because BITs offer an opportunity to negotiate and offer 
concessions to a potential investor in competition to and, hopefully, at the exclusion of, other 
potential hosts.”). 
 25. Several ICSID claims arise from NAFTA and free trade agreements, and BITs bear 
overwhelming similarity to these instruments. In principle, BITs, regional trade agreements, and 
free trade agreements may be discussed in tandem; however, this Note primarily focuses on 
BITs. On a broader scale, the international investment system may be described as a “dense and 
diverse web of overlapping instruments, including bilateral (BITs), regional, sectoral, and 
multilateral instruments, and non-binding initiatives which differ considerably in legal 
characteristics, scope, and subject-matter.” Friedl Weiss, Trade and Investment, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 6, at 182, 186. 
 26. Vandevelde, supra note 18, at 470. 
 27. Former Argentine foreign minister Carlos Calvo first articulated the doctrine, and 
several Latin American countries incorporated the doctrine into their constitutions. Christopher 
M. Ryan, Meeting Expectations: Assessing the Long-Term Legitimacy and Stability of 
International Investment Law, 29 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 725, 728 (2008). For further discussion of the 
Calvo Doctrine, see CHRISTOPHER F. DUGAN ET AL., INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION 16–19 
(2008). 
 28. Ryan, supra note 27, at 728. 
 29. Id. at 730. 
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Some commentators have suggested that “international legal 
sovereignty” is so important in the contemporary global economy 
that “any adverse impacts on Westphalian sovereignty are more than 
offset by the benefits that derive from [participation in the 
international investment] regime.”30 
By 2008, more than 2,500 BITs had entered into force.31 The 
agreements almost uniformly include provisions on the scope of 
investment,32 standards of treatment for investment,33 the scope of 
expropriation,34 and dispute settlement procedures.35 BITs are 
generally entered into on a take-it-or-leave-it basis36 according to 
drafts offered by developed countries.37 The one-sided nature of BIT 
negotiations favoring developed states can explain treaty 
standardization.38 
The manner in which developing countries seek to enter into 
BITs suggests that developing countries find the agreements essential 
to their economic well-being. Signing BITs “may help legitimize a 
developing country in the international arena and, thus, attract 
increased levels of foreign direct investment.”39 There is no definitive 
proof, however, that the existence of a BIT increases investment 
flows.40 The existence of a BIT may simply be one among many 
factors influencing an investment decision, including financial risks, 
market stability, human capital, and existing relationships.41 Professor 
Jürgen Kurtz has argued that a BIT may simply act as a mechanism of 
wealth transfer because investors do not consider the existence of a 
 
 30. Chris Tollefson, Games Without Frontiers: Investor Claims and Citizen Submissions 
Under the NAFTA Regime, 27 YALE J. INT’L L. 141, 144 (2002). 
 31. RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW 17 (2008). 
 32. E.g., U.S.-Uruguay BIT, supra note 17, at art. 2. 
 33. E.g., id. art. 5. 
 34. E.g., id. art. 6. 
 35. E.g., id. § B. 
 36. Elkins et al., supra note 5, at 276. 
 37. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A Brief History of International Investment Agreements, 12 
U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 157, 170 (2005). 
 38. See Elkins et al., supra note 5, at 277 (“This uniformity suggests that host countries are 
price takers with respect to the terms of these treaties . . . .”). 
 39. Ryan, supra note 28, at 737. 
 40. Susan D. Franck, Foreign Direct Investment, Investment Treaty Arbitration, and the 
Rule of Law, 19 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 337, 339 (2007). 
 41. See id. (listing “critical variables” that factor into investment decisions). 
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BIT when making investment decisions.42 Procedural rights granted in 
dispute settlement provisions, however, are among the most attractive 
aspects of BITs; these provisions regularly provide private investors 
with a right of action outside a host state’s legal system.43 
B.  ICSID and Investor-State Arbitration 
Nearly all BITs provide investors with a private right of action 
through ICSID arbitration, in accordance with arbitral rules 
established by the United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law (UNCITRAL), or through the International Chamber of 
Commerce Court of Arbitration.44 ICSID’s caseload surged as states 
entered into BITs, which represent the most common basis for 
investment arbitration.45 
ICSID, a branch of the World Bank, was established by the 1965 
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States 
and Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention) to provide an 
alternative international forum for disputes that arise in the course of 
international commerce.46 Unlike the World Trade Organization 
Dispute Settlement Body and other international dispute resolution 
institutions, ICSID does not require aggrieved investors to petition 
their home states to bring a claim against a host state.47 ICSID also 
provides an alternative to filing a suit in a host state’s domestic legal 
system, which may lack the sophisticated legal protections with which 
an investor may be familiar. Even in states with legitimate legal 
 
 42. Jürgen Kurtz, A General Investment Agreement in the WTO? Lessons from Chapter 11 
of NAFTA and the OECD Multilateral Agreement on Investment, 23 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 
713, 730 (2002). 
 43. See Franck, supra note 19, at 172–73 (“Rather than creating unenforceable substantive 
rights or forcing investors to rely on home governments to resolve disputes on their behalf, 
[investment] treaties provide a forum to redress alleged wrongs.”). 
 44. Stefan D. Amarasinha & Juliane Kokott, Multilateral Investment Rules Revisited, in 
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 6, at 119, 148–50. 
 45. DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 31, at 242. 
 46. See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and 
Nationals of Other States, Preamble, Mar. 18, 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 (addressing “the need for 
international cooperation and economic development”). 
 47. The advent of an investor-state dispute system can depoliticize a claim, particularly 
when home states may be reluctant to pursue a claim against a host state for reasons of 
diplomacy. See, e.g., Ibironke T. Odumosu, The Antinomies of the (Continued) Relevance of 
ICSID to the Third World, 8 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 345, 358 (2007) (noting that investor-state 
arbitration “provides an avenue for transferring disputes from political sphere to legal”). 
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systems, investors may justifiably fear a home-state bias.48 Investors 
also value the structural flexibility that parties retain during an ICSID 
arbitration.49 This very provision provides investors with a sense of 
protection that likely factors into a corporation’s investment 
decisions. More than 140 states are parties to the ICSID Convention.50 
Consent to arbitration occurs when a sovereign state signs an 
investment treaty that allows investors from another state to submit 
claims against it.51 Three arbitrators, one appointed by each party to a 
dispute and one appointed by the two initial arbitrators, comprise a 
typical ICSID tribunal arising from BITs.52 Arbitrators are generally 
familiar with investment disputes or a specialized area relevant to the 
dispute.53 ICSID tribunals apply previously stipulated governing law, 
and in the event that parties have not previously reached such an 
agreement, a tribunal will apply the host state’s domestic laws and 
rules of international law.54 Arbitral proceedings are, at least in part, 
made available publicly.55 They are popular among investors because 
arbitral awards are widely enforceable.56 
 
 48. Franck, supra note 40, at 365. ICSID arbitration distances investor-state disputes from 
political concerns. See W. Michael Reisman, The Breakdown of the Control Mechanism in 
ICSID Arbitration, 1989 DUKE L.J. 739, 751 (“[ICSID] also sought to reduce the role of national 
courts in enforcement even more than in other available systems of private international 
arbitration by providing for direct enforcement with no possibility of challenging an award in 
national courts in which enforcement otherwise would have been sought.”). 
 49. Eric Gottwald, Leveling the Playing Field: Is It Time for a Legal Assistance Center for 
Developing Nations in Investment Treaty Arbitration?, 22 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 237, 248–49 
(2007). 
 50. International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, List of Contracting States 
and Other Signatories of the Convention, ICSID/3 (Nov. 4, 2007), http://icsid.worldbank.org 
(follow “List of Contracting States” hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 28, 2009). 
 51. In addition to consent through bilateral and multilateral investment treaties, consent 
may arise through a direct agreement between a sovereign state and a private investor or 
through national legislation on investment. DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 31, at 238. 
 52. REED ET AL., supra note 3, at 78. 
 53. David R. Sedlak, Comment, ICSID’s Resurgence in International Investment 
Arbitration: Can the Momentum Hold?, 23 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 147, 152 (2004). 
 54. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of 
Other States, supra note 46, art. 42(1). In an ICSID arbitration, domestic rules are tested against 
international legal principles. In the event of an international law violation, a domestic law may 
not be applied in an award. Odumosu, supra note 47, at 368. 
 55. Odumosu, supra note 47, at 361. 
 56. See DUGAN ET AL., supra note 27, at 182 (“This widespread compliance with 
arbitration awards is due in large part to the effectiveness of the New York and ICSID 
Conventions’ enforcement provisions, which ensure that in most circumstances a losing 
respondent will be unable to avoid execution on assets in scores of national court 
jurisdictions.”). The New York Convention requires states to enforce arbitral awards under 
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Independent of BITs, customary international law57 allows states 
to regulate foreign investment within their borders as a function of 
sovereignty.58 Under this principle, states maintain the right to make 
decisions regarding permissible foreign investment within their 
borders and establish related controls.59 But customary international 
law, despite these benefits, has been considered insufficient to 
vindicate the rights of foreign investors,60 whose interests are unlikely 
to align with capital-importing states’ agendas.61 ICSID is in many 
respects a solution to cure perceived deficiencies in customary 
international law as private investors become more prevalent in the 
international arena.62 By allowing individuals to bring claims against 
foreign governments, ICSID reflects international law’s shift toward 
recognizing individuals as subjects.63 
ICSID’s novelty rests in the power it grants private investors 
wishing to bring suits against sovereign states;64 ICSID arbitration, 
however, was not commonly used during its first two decades.65 As 
states enter into an increasing number of BITs, investors have seized 
the opportunity to bring claims involving billions of dollars and 
 
most circumstances, id. at 88, and “creates an automatic priority for arbitration over national 
court litigation,” MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 16, at 83. 
 57. One definition characterizes customary international law as a source of law that 
“results from a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal 
obligation.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 102(2) (1987). State practice “includes diplomatic acts and instructions as well as 
public measures and other governmental acts and official statements of policy.” Id. § 102 cmt. B. 
For a discussion of customary international law, see generally LORI F. DAMROSCH ET AL., 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 59–108 (4th ed. 2001). 
 58. Mosoti, supra note 21, at 100. 
 59. Id. 
 60. James D. Fry, International Human Rights Law in Investment Arbitration: Evidence of 
International Law’s Unity, 18 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 77, 114 (2007). 
 61. See infra Part I.A. 
 62. See Gabriel Egli, Comment, Don’t Get Bit: Addressing ICSID’s Inconsistent 
Application of Most-Favored-Nation Clauses to Dispute Resolution Provisions, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 
1045, 1064 (2007) (“The lack of customary international law governing the treatment of 
international investments makes the current BIT regime essential to the protection of 
international investors and investments.”). 
 63. Christopher J. Borgen, Transnational Tribunals and the Transmission of Norms: The 
Hegemony of Process, 39 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 685, 686 (2007) (“This shift from inter-
State dispute resolution to transnational dispute resolution is . . . . part of the larger story of the 
increasing importance of individuals as actors under, and objects of, international law.”). 
 64. See Franck, supra note 40, at 343 (explaining that ICSID provides a private right of 
action and a forum in which investors may act as private attorneys general). 
 65. See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 31, at 2 (describing ICSID as “dormant” until 
the early 1990s). 
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implicating questions regarding sovereignty.66 The 122 pending67 and 
176 concluded68 ICSID arbitrations amount to what some have called 
a “litigation explosion.”69 ICSID arbitration and other dispute 
resolution provisions within BITs are attractive to investors and their 
home states because “[t]rust in the future conduct of [the] host state 
and investor lies at the heart of every investment decision.”70 
Capital-exporting states and private investors maintain several 
justifications for using ICSID to vindicate rights under BITs. First, 
developed states wish to secure legal rights for their citizens 
comparable to those found within sophisticated legal systems.71 
Second, states themselves have an interest in removing themselves 
from investment disputes and leaving their resolution to 
nongovernmental entities for political and financial reasons.72 Finally, 
participation in the international investment regime may enhance 
legal procedures and substance in developing states.73 Because parties 
may appoint arbitrators who are knowledgeable in the area of 
investment disputes74 but may not have a connection with either 
party,75 ICSID arbitration may lessen some of the bias inherent in an 
international dispute. 
C.  Potential Challenges to ICSID’s Legitimacy as a Justification for 
Change 
Despite the legitimacy-enhancing rules described in Part I.B and 
ICSID’s arguable success in providing remedies for private investors, 
ICSID may be improved in many respects. Common concerns involve 
 
 66. Franck, supra note 19, at 165. 
 67. International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, supra note 3. 
 68. International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, List of Concluded Cases, 
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=GenCaseDtlsRH&actionVal=List
Concluded (last visited Sept. 28, 2009). 
 69. Franck, supra note 19, at 165. 
 70. DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 31, at 6. 
 71. Ryan, supra note 28, at 742. 
 72. See id. (“[B]y creating a private right of action for investors, governments effectively 
depoliticized investment disputes and transferred the responsibility and cost of enforcement to 
investors.”). 
 73. See id. (“[D]eveloped countries hoped that the BIT regime would increase the global 
respect for property rights and lead to an improvement in the domestic legal systems of 
developing countries . . . .”); see also Borgen, supra note 63, at 688 (asserting that international 
dispute resolution reinforces both substantive law and procedures for evaluating claims). 
 74. Sedlak, supra note 53, at 153. 
 75. Id. at 152. 
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the tribunal’s legitimacy,76 arbitrator accountability,77 costs,78 
transparency,79 and award consistency.80 ICSID’s surge in usage has 
simultaneously rendered it less popular among host states.81 Some 
states are beginning once again to embrace the Calvo Doctrine, 
emphasizing sovereignty over international cooperation, and have 
either adopted or contemplated “measures to limit investment treaty 
arbitrations and bring [investment disputes] under national control.”82 
These perceived weaknesses in ICSID arbitration and corresponding 
responses illustrate the need for reform; it is possible that an 
amendment to the ICSID Convention itself could temper some of 
these concerns. 
The strongest manifestation of a distaste for ICSID came in 2007, 
when Bolivia withdrew from the ICSID Convention83 following 
President Evo Morales’s nationalization of hydrocarbon assets.84 
Ecuador officially limited the scope of its participation in ICSID 
when it filed a notification of certain classes of disputes for which it 
 
 76. See Odumosu, supra note 47, at 373 (arguing that ICSID faces a legitimacy crisis 
because of its adoption of a “single economic rationale for investment protection” that does not 
address alternative interests). 
 77. See Borgen, supra note 63, at 737 (describing participants in investor-state disputes as 
an interconnected elite). 
 78. See Gottwald, supra note 49, at 239 (recognizing the expense developing countries must 
make for a proper defense in investor-state disputes). 
 79. See id. at 256 (emphasizing the negative effects related to difficulties finding previous 
ICSID awards). 
 80. Egli, supra note 62, at 1078–79 (expressing concern regarding inconsistencies in 
investment arbitrations, which “often lack the finality and comparative uniformity of traditional 
court rulings”). 
 81. These countries include Argentina, Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, described infra 
notes 83–91 and accompanying text. 
 82. Wenhua Shan, From “North-South Divide” to “Public-Private Debate”: Revival of the 
Calvo Doctrine and the Changing Landscape in International Investment Law, 27 NW. J. INT’L L. 
& BUS. 631, 635 (2007). Even the United States’ revised approach to investment treaties has 
been described as an “apparent adoption of the Calvo Doctrine.” DUGAN ET AL., supra note 27, 
at 488. 
 83. Press Release, International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, Bolivia 
Submits a Notice Under Article 71 of the ICSID Convention (May 16, 2007), 
http://icsid.worldbank.org (follow “More” hyperlink under “Announcements,” then follow 
hyperlink to “Denunciation of ICSID Convention”) (last visited Aug. 19, 2009). 
 84. Kevin T. Jacobs & Matthew G. Paulson, The Convergence of Renewed Nationalization, 
Rising Commodities, and “Americanization” in International Arbitration and the Need for More 
Rigorous Legal and Procedural Defenses, 43 TEX. INT’L L.J. 359, 382 (2008). 
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rejected ICSID’s jurisdiction.85 The exception includes oil, gas, and 
minerals.86 
Some states have expressed criticism with respect to ICSID. 
Argentina, which faced dozens of ICSID claims87 in response to the 
2001 financial crisis,88 has been critical of ICSID.89 In its legal 
arguments before ICSID tribunals, Argentina has argued that its 
monetary actions, which relied on non-precluded measures provisions 
within its BITs, were necessary.90 Argentina has also advanced an 
argument that BITs and investor-state dispute procedures run afoul 
of its constitution.91 
Some developed states have even acted in a manner that 
forecloses ICSID arbitration. The 2004 United States-Australia Free 
Trade Agreement excluded an investor-state dispute provision,92 
although these provisions are routinely included in comparable 
agreements concluded by other states.93 One explanation for this 
omission suggests that the parties attempted to establish a shield from 
liability.94 Should additional states reject participation, ICSID may 
 
 85. Press Release, International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, Ecuador’s 
Notification Under Article 25(4) of the ICSID Convention (Dec. 5, 2007), 
http://icsid.worldbank.org (follow “More” hyperlink under “Announcements,” then follow 
hyperlink to “Ecuador’s Notification under Article 25(4) of the ICSID Convention”) (last 
visited Aug. 19, 2009). 
 86. Jacobs & Paulson, supra note 84, at 383. 
 87. Odumosu, supra note 47, at 373. 
 88. For a discussion of investor-state arbitration in the context of sovereign debt, see 
generally Karen Halverson Cross, Arbitration as a Means of Resolving Sovereign Debt Disputes, 
17 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 335 (2006); Michael Waibel, Opening Pandora’s Box: Sovereign Bonds 
in International Arbitration, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 711 (2007). 
 89. See Shan, supra note 82, at 643 (describing the Argentine government’s “attempt to 
‘renationali[z]e’ state-investor disputes”). Venezuela and Nicaragua have also “questioned their 
commitment to international investment law.” Ryan, supra note 28, at 726. Russia, Ukraine, the 
Republic of Congo, Indonesia, and Pakistan have grown reluctant to enforce ICSID awards. 
Emily A. Alexander, Note, Taking Account of Reality: Adopting Contextual Standards for 
Developing Countries in International Investment Law, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 817, 829 (2008). 
 90. For a comprehensive analysis of non-precluded measures provisions in investor-state 
disputes, see William W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Investment Protection in 
Extraordinary Times: The Interpretation and Application of Non-Precluded Measures Provisions 
in Bilateral Investment Treaties, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 307 (2008). 
 91. Shan, supra note 82, at 638. 
 92. Vandevelde, supra note 37, at 190. This dispute resolution provision demonstrates that 
states may find alternative solutions to investment law disputes. 
 93. E.g., U.S.-Uruguay BIT, supra note 17, at § B. 
 94. See Franck, supra note 40, at 360–61 (“[T]wo nations with shared economic and 
political goals, and substantial cross-border investment flows, recognize that they are both likely 
to be on the receiving end of investor-State disputes. This means that both countries have an 
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find its legitimacy compromised.95 To prevent further criticism by 
ICSID members, the arbitral procedure should better reflect the 
interests of developing states. 
II.  UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPTS TO ESTABLISH A COMPREHENSIVE 
MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY 
Numerous proposals for a comprehensive multilateral 
investment treaty have been made since World War II, but none have 
garnered sufficient support.96 This Part addresses previous failed 
attempts to reach a comprehensive, multilateral framework for 
international investment. Part II.A looks at investment negotiations 
in the context of international trade. Part II.B addresses the failures 
of the 1990s negotiations for a Multilateral Agreement on Investment 
(MAI). 
A common thread in the history of these multilateral investment 
agreement talks has been the conflicting interests between developed 
states—traditionally capital exporters—and developing states that 
import capital. A multilateral agreement streamlining the 
international investment system would likely only be plausible to the 
extent that these competing interests may be reconciled. Introducing 
an ICSID Convention provision modeled after the GATT General 
Exceptions would provide an opportunity to address the interests of 
capital importers in a forum preferred by capital exporters. 
A.  Investment in the World Trade Organization System 
The international community first considered a multilateral 
investment agreement as a possible third international structure to 
complement the post–World War II Bretton Woods institutions in the 
1940s.97 At the United States’ insistence, the 1948 Charter for an 
International Trade Organization, or the Havana Charter, would 
have provided protection for foreign investment from discriminatory 
 
incentive to create a dispute resolution mechanism that creates barriers limiting the potential 
number of claims.”). It is plausible that this decision had little to do with distrust for the 
investor-state dispute system, but rather involved a comfort level based on the parties’ mutual 
use of the Common Law. See id. at 360 (“[B]oth countries have well-developed rules of law and 
a reliable and independent court systems [sic].”). 
 95. For further discussion on developed states that have reformed positions on 
international investment law, see infra Part IV.A. 
 96. Amarasinha & Kokott, supra note 44, at 125–29. 
 97. Riyaz Dattu, A Journey from Havana to Paris: The Fifty-Year Quest for the Elusive 
Multilateral Agreement on Investment, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 275, 287 (2000). 
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treatment and expropriation.98 United States corporations, however, 
felt the Havana Charter was too lenient toward developing countries, 
whereas developing countries believed the proposed standards 
granted investors too much power.99 The disagreement resulted in the 
Havana Charter’s failure.100 From 1973 to 1979, the United States 
again encouraged an investment agreement for the GATT Tokyo 
Round agenda, but developing countries blocked the suggestion.101 
Limited measures relating to investment were adopted during 
the Uruguay Round, which also implemented the World Trade 
Organization (WTO).102 The General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS),103 designed “to remove barriers to cross-border trade in 
services”104 applies wherever services are delivered through one of 
four modes, including a “commercial presence,”105 which encompasses 
investment. The Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures 
(TRIMs Agreement)106 created a limited exception to GATT articles 
for investment related to the trade of goods following an investor’s 
entry into a host state.107 The narrow TRIMs measures allow 
governments to mandate that investors incorporate domestically 
produced inputs in manufacturing operations.108 These provisions did 
not assume the role of BITs because they are not comprehensive 
agreements on investment. Developed states walked away from the 
Uruguay Round feeling dissatisfied with the investment measures and 
 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 288. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Benjamin Martin, Comment, An Environmental Remedy to Paralyzed Negotiations for 
a Multilateral Foreign Direct Investment Agreement, 1 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 209, 232 
(2007). 
 102. For a comprehensive discussion of the Uruguay Round negotiations and their results, 
see generally WTO SECRETARIAT, GUIDE TO THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS (1999). 
 103. General Agreement on Trade in Services, supra note 10. 
 104. Vandevelde, supra note 37, at 176. 
 105. General Agreement on Trade in Services supra note 10, art. I.2. Professor Kenneth J. 
Vandevelde has pointed out that under the GATS, “the WTO potentially has jurisdiction over 
all foreign investment in the service sector of the economy.” Vandevelde, supra note 37, at 176. 
 106. Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, supra note 11. 
 107. The TRIMs agreement has been criticized for taking a skeptical view of investment that 
does not incentivize investment. See, e.g., Dattu, supra note 97, at 291 (addressing criticism that 
calls TRIMs “attuned to the concerns of an era in policy-making characterized more by 
suspicion of—and the need to control—foreign investment than by keenness to compete for and 
attract such investment” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 108. WTO SECRETARIAT, supra note 102, at 77. 
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“defeated by the developing world in their quest to achieve a high 
degree of investment liberalization within the WTO.”109 
In 2001, the Doha Ministerial Declaration again included plans 
for multilateral investment negotiations.110 Developing states both 
supported and criticized the possibility of revisiting investment.111 But 
opposition from certain developing states, including India and 
Malaysia, put an end to these investment talks.112 These states 
opposed the negotiations for several reasons, including: lack of 
preparation for additional rulemaking, a belief that investment policy 
should remain in state hands and not be transferred to the WTO, 
confidence in the protection that BITs afford investors, a view that 
investment policy could not treat all states equally, and a desire to 
develop domestic industries.113 
B.  The Multilateral Agreement on Investment 
Outside the WTO negotiating environment, the United States 
encouraged negotiations for a comprehensive, multilateral investment 
agreement within the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) in 1995.114 Supporters of the proposed MAI 
hoped that a swift round of negotiations would be possible in light of 
the OECD’s like-minded members, namely developed states with 
“well-established, liberal, and transparent foreign investment 
policies.”115 The MAI initially provided measures for increased 
protection for investment, including national treatment, 
nondiscrimination, and reduced barriers to investment.116 The initial 
 
 109. Dattu, supra note 97, at 295. Attempts to again revisit investment regulation in the 
Doha Round were pushed aside. Martin, supra note 101, at 235. 
 110. See generally GALLAGHER, supra note 12, at 96–119 (describing the Doha Ministerial 
Conference agenda and achievements). 
 111. Chile, Costa Rica, Korea, and Mexico supported investment negotiations. Weiss, supra 
note 25, at 189. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. See Kurtz, supra note 42, at 757 (“The basis for the U.S. preference for the OECD 
appears to be linked to the relatively modest results of the Uruguay Round TRIMS Agreement 
which was often attributed to the recalcitrance of developing states.”). 
 115. Dattu, supra note 97, at 276; see also Kurtz, supra note 42, at 757 (describing the 
intended MAI negotiations to be “an uncontroversial, somewhat technical exercise of building 
upon existing norms”). 
 116. COMM. ON INT’L INV. & MULTINATIONAL ENTERS. & COMM. ON CAPITAL 
MOVEMENTS AND INVISIBLE TRANSACTIONS, OECD, A MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT ON 
INVESTMENT, DAFFE/CMIT/CIME(95)13/FINAL (May 5, 1995), available at 
http://www1.oecd.org/daf/mai/htm/cmitcime95.htm. 
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dispute settlement procedures would have allowed for both state-to-
state and investor-state dispute systems, including ICSID 
arbitration.117 
By removing negotiations from the WTO, MAI proponents 
believed that developing states’ objections would be foreclosed from 
negotiations.118 OECD members hoped to swiftly negotiate119 and sign 
a multilateral treaty to which developing states would later accede.120 
Ultimately, the inability of even developed capital-exporting states to 
agree on investment terms resulted in the MAI’s demise.121 France’s 
withdrawal from the negotiations in October 1998 signaled the end of 
the MAI talks.122 France grounded its withdrawal upon a Special 
Commission’s determination that the MAI threatened national 
sovereignty123 and also objected to the absence of a cultural exception 
in the draft agreement.124 Within two months, MAI negotiations 
within the OECD ceased.125 
Interestingly, the MAI negotiations incorporated many of the 
arguments developing states traditionally advanced, despite the 
OECD negotiation setting. When a MAI draft leaked out over the 
Internet in 1997, nongovernmental organizations and civil society 
expressed outrage against the exclusive nature of the negotiations, 
which “created an air of hostility to the project that made it hard to 
justify on a political level.”126 In response, later drafts of the MAI 
incorporated provisions addressing sustainable development. These 
revisions included recognition of sustainable development in the 
 
 117. Dattu, supra note 97, at 301. 
 118. M. SORNARAJAH, THE SETTLEMENT OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISPUTES 170 (2000). 
 119. The OECD originally envisioned MAI negotiations to conclude within two years. 
Kurtz, supra note 42, at 758. 
 120. Dattu, supra note 97, at 298. Some developing states served as observers in the OECD 
negotiations, including Argentina and Brazil. Id. at 295. 
 121. See id. at 298 (pointing to the amount of bracketed text in the draft MAI to 
demonstrate how contentious the negotiations were even among OECD members). 
 122. DAVID HENDERSON, THE MAI AFFAIR: A STORY AND ITS LESSONS 31–32 (1999). 
 123. Peter T. Muchlinski, The Rise and Fall of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment: 
Where Now?, 34 INT’L LAW. 1033, 1048–49 & n.83 (2000). 
 124. France and Canada, who “feared an ‘Americanisation’ of global media industries,” 
supported a cultural exception that would allow discriminatory action in the interest of 
preserving cultural heritage. Id. at 66. See generally Daisuke Beppu, Note, When Cultural Value 
Justifies Protectionism: Interpreting the Language of the GATT to Find a Limited Cultural 
Exception to the National Treatment Principle, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1765 (2008) (analyzing 
cultural exceptions in the context of international trade). 
 125. Kurtz, supra note 42, at 761. 
 126. Muchlinski, supra note 123, at 1040. 
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treaty’s Preamble,127 confirmation of state regulatory authority 
regarding health, safety, and environmental concerns consistent with 
the MAI’s text,128 and a provision restricting activity that constitutes a 
race to the bottom.129 A fourth suggestion would have appended to 
the MAI OECD’s Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises—a 
document that expresses expectations for corporate behavior, 
including employment standards and environmental concerns.130 
These issues are consistent with some of the concerns regarding 
regulatory autonomy expressed by developing states in investment 
treaty talks.131 
The MAI may have ultimately failed, but it clarified some of the 
central questions that will arise in future multilateral investment 
initiatives. The willingness of OECD negotiators to revise the draft 
MAI to address civil society’s interests demonstrates that compromise 
will not only be necessary, but also feasible, as the international 
investment law community gradually agrees upon elements for a 
comprehensive international investment regime. A series of 
compromises should be reached before again attempting to advance 
what one commentator describes as a “patchwork of international 
rules on foreign investment.”132 
To reach a successful multilateral investment agreement, the 
international investment system should implement incremental 
changes that will help prospective participants in the system recognize 
the advantages that such an agreement would provide. In 2000, one 
commentator noted that “[m]any more bilateral and regional 
agreements on investment have to be negotiated and concluded” to 
make a multilateral agreement realistic.133 In addition to signing 
additional investment treaties, the long-term nature of FDI134 means 
that it may be premature to judge the effectiveness of recent treaties. 
 
 127. Rainer Geiger, Towards a Multilateral Agreement on Investment, 31 CORNELL INT’L 
L.J. 467, 472 (1998). 
 128. Id. at 472–73. 
 129. Id. at 473. The language of this exception was drawn from NAFTA principles. Kurtz, 
supra note 42, at 772. 
 130. Geiger, supra note 127, at 473 (describing the OECD’s Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises as “an effective tool in promoting responsible conduct”). 
 131. E.V.K. FitzGerald, Developing Countries and Multilateral Investment Negotiations, in 
MULTILATERAL REGULATION OF INVESTMENT 35, 48 (E.C. Nieuwenhuys & M.M.T.A. Brus 
eds., 2001). 
 132. Kurtz, supra note 42, at 723. 
 133. Dattu, supra note 97, at 277. 
 134. E.g., DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 31, at 3. 
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Investment does not immediately spike following the conclusion of a 
BIT,135 and certain types of disputes may be unlikely to arise in the 
years immediately following an investment. Amending the ICSID 
Convention in a manner that directly addresses the competing 
interests that have stifled decades of multilateral investment 
discussions would ultimately guide an attempt to ratify a 
comprehensive multilateral investment agreement. Attempts to enact 
a wholesale multilateral treaty on investment have failed, and a more 
gradual approach appears suitable. 
III.  BORROWING FROM TRADE LAW’S GENERAL EXCEPTIONS 
TO RECONCILE DIFFERENCES IN AN 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT REGIME 
The General Exceptions provisions in international trade 
instruments set forth a series of exceptions that may logically be 
carried over to the international investment area as a framework for 
formally recognizing state regulatory autonomy in certain areas. 
Article XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade136 
establishes General Exceptions for legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
regulation.137 The provision includes measures relating to public 
morals;138 human, animal, or plant life or health;139 labor;140 cultural 
 
 135. E.g., Franck, supra note 40, at 339. 
 136. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra note 9. The GATT provisions sought 
to reduce trade barriers and served as a de facto trade regime from their adoption in 1947 until 
their incorporation into the World Trade Organization in 1994. Edith Brown Weiss & John H. 
Jackson, The Framework for Environment and Trade Disputes, in RECONCILING 
ENVIRONMENT AND TRADE 1, 5 (Edith Brown Weiss, John H. Jackson & Nathalie Bernasconi-
Osterwalder eds., 2d ed. 2008). 
 137. The GATT General Exceptions have a long history. The exceptions were first included 
in the 1927 International Agreement for the Suppression of Import and Export Prohibitions and 
Restrictions. Padideh Ala’i, Free Trade or Sustainable Development? An Analysis of the WTO 
Appellate Body’s Shift to a More Balanced Approach to Trade Liberalization, 14 AM. U. INT’L L. 
REV. 1129, 1132 (1999). In 1947, the same exceptions became the basis for GATT Article XX. 
Id. at 1133. 
 138. The Article XX(a) public morals exception has never been interpreted under the 
GATT or the WTO systems, but conflicts between trade and public morals might relate to fur 
trade, pornographic material, products manufactured by child labor, or animal cloning. Anne-
Marie de Brouwer, GATT Article XX’s Environmental Exceptions Explored: Is There Room for 
National Policies? Balancing Rights and Obligations of WTO Members Under the WTO Regime, 
in THE WTO AND CONCERNS REGARDING ANIMALS AND NATURE 9, 23 (Anton Vedder ed., 
2003). The provision’s uncertain legal meaning may be a reason for its nonuse, despite its 
potential for use in environmental disputes. Id. For additional discussion of possible applications 
of the public morals exception, see Steve Charnovitz, The Moral Exception in Trade Policy, 38 
VA. J. INT’L L. 689, 736–43 (1998). 
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value;141 and exhaustible natural resources.142 Within these areas, 
states may act in a manner that amounts to discrimination provided 
the measures are not “arbitrary or unjustifiable.”143 Similar provisions 
are included in Article XIV of the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS) and in Article III of the TRIMs agreement, which 
both specifically address international investment.144 Through these 
provisions, General Exceptions legitimizing state regulation for 
sustainable development or social goals have the potential to cover 
nearly all aspects of international trade. Investment law has the 
capacity to formally provide for similar protections, even though 
trade and investment bear unique attributes. 
The WTO Appellate Body has gradually broadened its 
interpretation of the General Exceptions provisions, making them 
feasible safeguards for government action.145 Initially, these provisions 
were interpreted narrowly. Two GATT decisions from the 1990s 
concluded that United States regulations barring the importation of 
tuna caught in a manner harmful to dolphins contravened trade 
provisions under GATT, despite the environmental protection 
provisions set forth in Article XX.146 In the first dispute, the GATT 
panel expressed a belief that Article XX should be interpreted 
narrowly,147 and that the word “necessary” in Article XX(b) ought not 
to protect unpredictable environmental conditions.148 
 
 139. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra note 9, art. XX(b). 
 140. Id. art. XX(e). 
 141. This exception relates to measures “imposed for the protection of national treasures of 
artistic, historic, or archaeological value.” Id. art. XX(f). 
 142. Id. art. XX(g). 
 143. Id. art. XX. 
 144. Article 3 of the TRIMS agreement adopts all of GATT’s exceptions. Agreement on 
Trade-Related Investment Measures, supra note 11, art. 3. For further discussion of the GATS 
and TRIMs agreements, see supra text accompanying notes 103–09. This Note generally refers 
to GATT Article XX exceptions, but the reasoning provided would be equally applicable using 
the GATS and TRIMS exceptions. 
 145. Ala’i, supra note 137, at 1132. 
 146. Panel Report, United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, ¶ 6.1, DS29/R (June 16, 
1994) [hereinafter Dolphin-Tuna II]; Panel Report, United States—Restrictions on Imports of 
Tuna, ¶ 7.1(a), DS21/R–39S/155 (Sept. 3, 1991) [hereinafter Dolphin-Tuna I]. 
 147. Dolphin-Tuna I, supra note 146, ¶ 5.22. 
 148. Id. ¶ 5.28 (noting that the U.S. limitation afforded the Mexican authorities inadequate 
notice as to whether their policies conformed to U.S. standards at any given moment). 
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In its 1998 decision in United States—Import Prohibition of 
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (Shrimp-Turtle),149 however, the 
WTO Appellate Body150 recognized the right of WTO member states 
to invoke Article XX exceptions151 provided the activities meet 
requirements set forth in the provision.152 To reach this conclusion, 
the WTO Appellate Body relied upon the Vienna Convention of the 
Law of Treaties.153 The Appellate Body also set forth a two-step test 
to determine Article XX’s applicability. First, a government action 
must fall within the meaning of one of the exceptions.154 Second, the 
measure must be consistent with Article XX’s chapeau.155 When the 
Appellate Body applied this framework in Shrimp-Turtle, however, it 
found that a U.S. regulation on shrimp imports did not take into 
account differing conditions in other states,156 and it found that the 
measure failed to satisfy the chapeau.157 
In 2001, a court used Article XX to allow public health 
considerations to trump trade goals. In European Communities—
Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos Containing Products,158 the 
WTO Appellate Body validated France’s use of Article XX to allow a 
ban on asbestos production, use, and trade.159 In recognizing the 
health risks despite Canada’s commercial argument to uphold 
 
 149. Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and 
Shrimp Products, WT/DS56/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998). 
 150. Following the conclusion of the Uruguay Round and the birth of the WTO, the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Body and the WTO Appellate Body became the formal dispute resolution 
institutions within the WTO. Weiss & Jackson, supra note 136, at 18–19. 
 151. United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, supra note 
149, ¶ 156. The Appellate Body stated that WTO members “can and should” adopt measures to 
protect endangered species and the environment. Id. ¶ 185. 
 152. Id. ¶ 157. 
 153. Id. at 61 n.152. 
 154. Robert Howse, The Appellate Body Rulings in the Shrimp/Turtle Case: A New Legal 
Baseline for the Trade and Environment Debate, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 491, 494 (2002). 
 155. Id. Article XX’s chapeau, or preamble, reads 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which 
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between 
countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on 
international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the 
adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures. 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra note 9, art. XX. 
 156. United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, supra note 
149, ¶ 164. 
 157. Id. ¶ 187. 
 158. Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and 
Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001). 
 159. KELLY, supra note 152, at 102. 
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traditional trade goals, “the Appellate Body demonstrated its desire 
to uphold the panel’s precedent-setting support for non-trade 
goals.”160 
This evolution of Article XX jurisprudence in the international 
trade context demonstrates an increasing openness to environmental 
and public health objectives in an area of law designed to promote 
commercial interests. Although some commentators have criticized 
the WTO’s ability to make use of Article XX in a genuine fashion,161 
exceptions based on this model could create an effective mechanism 
for reconciling competing interests in the international investment 
context. 
The traditional separation of trade and investment law is an 
apparent obstacle to importing GATT principles into ICSID. 
International law treats trade and investment separately due to their 
distinct economic roles.162 Because trade involves exports and 
investment attracts capital, legal frameworks designed to promote 
these sectors to their fullest would involve inverse goals.163 
Considering trade and investment together, despite this 
distinction, is reasonable because both subjects involve international 
commerce. A single government office within a state often handles 
trade and investment.164 At the individual level, certain business 
operations may involve a combination of trade and investment 
initiatives, and through legal argument, certain categories of trade 
may be categorized as investment. The group of states that would 
adhere to a comprehensive international investment treaty would 
likely mirror participants in the World Trade Organization, and 
 
 160. Id. at 106. 
 161. E.g., Charles R. Fletcher, Greening World Trade: Reconciling GATT and Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements Within the Existing World Trade Regime, 5 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & 
POL’Y 341, 356 (1996). 
 162. The duration of transactions reinforces this distinction. See, e.g., DOLZER & 
SCHREUER, supra note 31, at 3 (“Whereas a trade deal typically consists in a one-time exchange 
of goods and money, the decision to invest in a foreign country initiates a long-term relationship 
between the investor and the host country.”). 
 163. See Nicholas DiMascio & Joost Pauwelyn, Nondiscrimination in Trade and Investment 
Treaties: Worlds Apart or Two Sides of the Same Coin?, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 48, 53–54 (2008) 
(“[T]rade and investment disciplines have traditionally focused on different, but 
complementary, objectives: liberalization of trade flows, in the case of trade, and protection and 
promotion of foreign investment, in the case of investment.”). 
 164. In the United States, the Office of the United States Trade Representative handles 
matters of both trade and investment. For more information, see Office of the United States 
Trade Representative, Mission of the USTR, http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/mission (last visited 
Aug. 19, 2009). 
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investment rules would therefore be barred from undermining trade 
agreements. 
International trade and international investment law share many 
of the same underlying values. Article XX’s implementation in 
GATT required an evaluation of “the balance between the free trade 
imperatives of . . . nondiscrimination rules and the various 
exemptions for national policies.”165 This same evaluation is at the 
heart of the disagreement in the international investment law context, 
even though regional investment efforts such as NAFTA have not 
included exceptions similar to Article XX.166 Additionally, a number 
of international investment law analyses prescribe an international 
investment framework within the WTO.167 Establishing a practice that 
resembles GATT’s Article XX General Exceptions would streamline 
future negotiations for a comprehensive, multilateral investment 
regime as part of the WTO. For these reasons, borrowing principles 
from international trade law is appropriate for the investment 
regime.168 
IV.  COMPROMISE THROUGH AN ICSID CONVENTION AMENDMENT 
An alternative approach to WTO and OECD attempts to 
reconcile competing interests in international investments may lie 
within the ICSID framework. A primary ICSID goal “is to provide a 
level playing field for investors and host countries.”169 At present, 
however, developing host states facing ICSID claims170 often lack 
sufficient resources to adequately represent themselves in 
proceedings. Developing states must pay expensive legal fees to elite 
Western law firms171 to obtain representation comparable in caliber to 
that of private investors. When states cannot or do not wish to impose 
 
 165. Sol Picciotto, Linkages in International Investment Regulation: The Antinomies of the 
Draft Multilateral Agreement on Investment, 19 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 731, 737 (1998). 
 166. Kurtz, supra note 42, at 740. 
 167. E.g., Dattu, supra note 97, at 315–16. 
 168. But see Kurtz, supra note 42, at 741 (“GATT panels themselves have struggled with the 
application of Article XX and its constituent parts, which has led to a variety of inconsistent 
interpretations. These inconsistencies have in turn led to questions about the underlying 
legitimacy of the GATT and the capacity of GATT panels to manage complex tradeoffs 
between free trade and broader public values.”). 
 169. Sedlak, supra note 53, at 153. 
 170. Nearly two-thirds of filed investment treaty claims involve developing host states. 
Gottwald, supra note 49, at 250. 
 171. Id. at 239. 
SUPNIK FOR WEBSITE.DOC 11/1/2009  8:53:48 PM 
2009] AMENDING THE ICSID CONVENTION 367 
this burden on taxpayers, government attorneys without specialized 
knowledge of the international investment regime are “left to 
contend with scattered and incomplete legal authority resources with 
no organized legal assistance from the international community.”172 
An ICSID provision that recognizes legitimate government 
regulation relating to the environment and social rights could provide 
leverage to states in investor-state disputes and further ICSID’s goal 
of creating a level playing field. 
The ICSID Convention may be amended in accordance with the 
provisions set forth in Chapter IX.173 Ratification, acceptance, or 
approval by all Contracting States is required for an amendment to 
become effective.174 Amending the ICSID Convention, therefore, is 
no easy feat. Some scholars have even suggested that the unanimous 
ratification requirement largely rules out the possibility of ICSID 
amendments.175 Other scholars believe that pending amendments 
become effective among contracting states that agree to them before 
they achieve universal ratification.176 Despite this controversy, a series 
of ICSID amendments became effective in 2006, including measures 
to make ICSID more transparent, increase third-party participation, 
and provide a mechanism to dismiss frivolous claims.177 
The 2006 amendments demonstrate that the amendment 
procedure can be used when necessary to reflect evolving norms 
common among ICSID Convention signatories.178 An amendment 
 
 172. Id. at 240. 
 173. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of 
Other States, supra note 46, ch. 9. 
 174. Id. art. 66(1). Any state party may propose an amendment to the Administrative 
Council. If a proposal is approved by a majority vote by the Administrative Council, the 
proposed amendment will be circulated to all parties to the ICSID Convention. Id. For a brief 
overview of ICSID amendment procedures, see Reisman, supra note 48, at 806. 
 175. See, e.g., CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 1267 
(2001) (adopting this position). 
 176. Reisman, supra note 48, at 806 (“It appears that prior to universal acceptance, the 
amendment would be effective between contracting states that accepted it, but not between an 
accepting state and a state that had not yet accepted it.”). But see SCHREUER, supra note 175, at 
1267 n.2 (“Art. 40 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties foresees the application of 
an agreement amending a treaty only among States that are parties to the amending agreement. 
But this rule only applies unless the treaty in question otherwise provides.”). 
 177. J. Anthony VanDuzer, Enhancing the Procedural Legitimacy of Investor-State 
Arbitration Through Transparency and Amicus Curiae Participation, 52 MCGILL L.J. 681, 687 
(2007). 
 178. But see Sedlak, supra note 53, at 157 (calling the ICSID Convention amendment 
process “unwieldy to the point of being impractical”). 
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recognizing the consideration of environmental, public health, and 
labor standards could reasonably be accepted by all contracting 
states. First, the provision would signal to signatories that ICSID is 
willing to look more favorably upon a state’s ability to regulate. 
Second, to the extent that ICSID signatories recognize the 
importance of taking a step toward reconciling ongoing differences in 
comprehensive multilateral investment treaty negotiations,179 the 
potential long-term benefits of this provision should become 
apparent. Because the provision would address developing states’ 
interests in a manner that even developed states favoring investment 
liberalization have begun to advocate,180 the provision is an ideal point 
of departure for multilateral investment talks. 
Incremental modifications to the international investment 
regime through the ICSID Convention are appropriate in light of two 
key changes in the assumptions that underlie the international 
investment regime. This Part will explore these key changes. First, 
many suppliers of foreign investment come from developing 
countries, and developed states are increasingly capital importers.181 
Second, the ideological basis for strong investment protection 
underlying ICSID’s original mandate, which emphasized protection 
from widespread nationalization during the Cold War,182 is outdated. 
Addressing these concerns through an amendment to the ICSID 
Convention would better reflect contemporary concerns in 
international investment and enhance ICSID’s legitimacy. 
A.  Shifting the Paradigm: Capital Exporters Become Capital 
Importers 
The traditional international investment paradigm involves a 
developed state, typically the United States, Japan, or a Western 
European country, exporting capital to a developing state.183 In these 
situations, the capital exporter demands investment protection in the 
form of substantive rights, such as assurances for nondiscrimination 
 
 179. See Dattu, supra note 97, at 298–302 (identifying areas of disagreement in the MAI 
negotiations). 
 180. See 2004 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 17, art. 12 (recognizing expanded state regulatory 
autonomy in matters concerning environmental protection). 
 181. Vandevelde, supra note 37, at 182. 
 182. Id. at 167–70. 
 183. Kurtz, supra note 42, at 716 (observing that, as of 2000, most foreign direct investment 
came from a “Triad” consisting of the European Union, the United States, and Japan). 
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and against expropriation, as well as procedural rights through 
dispute resolution provisions. 
This paradigm has shifted since the turn of the twenty-first 
century. States that have traditionally been considered developing 
countries have increasingly become sources of foreign investment, 
rather than recipients.184 Developed states have simultaneously 
become capital importers.185 Moreover, developing states have 
entered into BITs with one another,186 perhaps indicating that some 
businesses based in developing states are becoming major investors.187 
South Korea, Singapore, and Malaysia initially led the way in 
supplying capital to traditional capital importers; they were later 
joined by Chile, Mexico, and South Africa.188 India, China, and Brazil 
are also increasingly capital exporters.189 A surge in claims, 
particularly those arising from NAFTA, against developed states 
through ICSID and other international arbitral procedures has led 
traditional advocates for strong investment protection190 to revisit 
their investment policy goals.191 
The United States Model BIT, as revised in 2004, further 
corroborates this shifting paradigm and adds two articles to protect 
and expand the regulatory mandate of host states. Article 12 guides 
the interpretation of BITs so that states may adopt, maintain, or 
enforce certain measures “in a manner sensitive to environmental 
concerns.”192 Article 13 states that “it is inappropriate to encourage 
 
 184. See Elkins et al., supra note 5, at 273 (observing that since 1999, the number of 
developing countries entering into bilateral investment treaties has exploded). 
 185. Vandevelde, supra note 37, at 182 (adding that “foreign direct investment in the United 
States grew from $83 billion in 1980 to $1.5 trillion in 2003”). 
 186. Shan, supra note 82, at 661 (“The changing role of developing states is also witnessed 
by a notable increase of South-South BITs in recent years . . . . [T]he largest number of new 
BITs signed during 2004 were between developing states.”). 
 187. Gottwald, supra note 49, at 243. 
 188. Shan, supra note 82, at 661; see also Vandevelde, supra note 37, at 182 (“In 2003, 
Singapore’s stock of direct investment abroad was larger than that of several developed 
countries, including Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Norway, and Portugal.”). 
 189. See Shan, supra note 82, at 661 (observing that India, China, and Brazil are “at the 
taking-off stage”). 
 190. The United States initiated investment liberalization reforms in connection with GATT 
and also recommended the OECD’s attempt to negotiate a multilateral agreement. See supra 
Part II. 
 191. See, e.g., Shan, supra note 82, at 650 (pointing out that in the wake of NAFTA 
tribunals, the United States has gradually weakened its commitment to investment protection). 
 192. 2004 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 17, art. 12. 
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investment by weakening or reducing the protections afforded in 
domestic labor laws.”193 
The model treaty’s rules on expropriation elaborate similar 
standards.194 These rules helped produce Annex B to the 2004 United 
States Model BIT. Annex B’s provisions include a statement that 
“[e]xcept in rare circumstances, nondiscriminatory regulatory actions 
by a Party that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public 
welfare objectives, such as public health, safety, and the environment, 
do not constitute indirect expropriations.”195 Previously, no such 
exceptions existed,196 and the United States refused to enter into a 
BIT that did not announce strict rules regarding expropriation.197 The 
United States adopted this view as capital inflows became more 
significant, and it found itself defending claims for expropriation.198 
Investors opposed the changes, calling them a “substantial weakening 
of investor protections . . . [not] justified by any reasonable 
assessment of risk to the United States as a defendant against 
potential claims.”199 
NAFTA’s investment provisions, to which the United States and 
Canada are subject, have been particularly relevant to this transition. 
During NAFTA negotiations, Canada largely turned away from 
considerations relating to sovereignty.200 It was not until Canada 
became subject to investor-state disputes that it urged that Chapter 11 
 
 193. Id. art. 13. 
 194. Article 6 of the 2004 U.S. Model BIT states that 
[n]either Party may expropriate or nationalize a covered investment either directly or 
indirectly through measures equivalent to expropriation or nationalization 
(‘expropriation’), except: (a) for a public purpose; (b) in a non-discriminatory 
manner; (c) on payment of prompt, adequate, and effective compensation; and (d) in 
accordance with due process of law. 
Id. art. 6. For further discussion of expropriation in international investment law, see infra Part 
IV.B. 
 195. 2004 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 17, at Annex B. 
 196. Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government 
of the Republic of Honduras Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investment, U.S.-Hond., July 1, 1995, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 106-27 (2000). 
 197. Vandevelde, supra note 37, at 171. 
 198. See Ryan, supra note 28, at 756 (“[I]n response to its new-found role as a respondent, 
the United States created a new model BIT that contains far more detailed provisions on certain 
procedural matters and certain substantive protections accorded to investors.”). 
 199. Proposed New U.S. “Model” Bilateral Investment Treaty, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 836, 837 
(2004) (quoting SUBCOMM. ON INV. OF THE U.S. DEP’T OF STATE ADVISORY COMM. ON INT’L 
ECON. POL., REPORT REGARDING THE DRAFT MODEL BILATERAL INV. TREATY 2–3 (Jan. 30, 
2004)). 
 200. Tollefson, supra note 30, at 146. 
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be revisited to allow nondiscriminatory regulations relating to public 
health and the environment.201 Canada also updated its model BIT.202 
These model BIT changes reflect a willingness on the part of 
some of the strongest advocates of investment protection, at least 
historically, to step back from traditionally one-sided BITs. Because 
an amendment for social and labor conditions would embody many of 
the principles that the United States has sought to enforce in the 
international investment regime since 2003, the United States would 
likely ratify the amendment, and, in turn, influence similarly situated 
developed states to do the same.203 
B.  Expropriation and the Outdated Ideological Assumptions 
Underlying International Investment Law 
Expropriation has long provoked a vigorous debate in 
international investment law.204 It has been described as the area in 
which “one sees most clearly the inevitable conflict between 
sovereignty and stability, between the State’s need to control its 
economy and the foreign investor’s need to anticipate the costs of 
that control.”205 Expropriation is central to the formation of any 
negotiation treaty because it directly affects the rights and 
expectations of investors.206 In addition to its recognition in customary 
international law,207 expropriation has long been recognized by the 
United States.208 Under the Hull Formula, announced by then-
Secretary of State Cordell Hull in 1938, expropriation requires 
 
 201. Id. 
 202. But see Shan, supra note 82, at 656 (pointing out that revised BITs “do not alter the 
fundamental character of these investment treaties as quintessential liberalist instruments, 
which only protect and ‘empower’ investors without sufficient consideration of the rights of host 
states and the duties of the investors”). 
 203. Several countries have followed the United States in reforming its approach to BITs, 
including Canada, Japan, and certain Latin American states. Id. at 652. 
 204. For background on expropriation in international investment law, see generally 
DUGAN ET AL., supra note 27, at 429–89; August Reinisch, Expropriation, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 15, at 407, 407–58. 
 205. Jack Coe, Jr. & Noah Rubins, Regulatory Expropriation and the Tecmed Case: Context 
and Contributions, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION: LEADING 
CASES FROM THE ICSID, NAFTA, BILATERAL TREATIES AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 597, 666–67 (Todd Weiler ed., 2005). 
 206. See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 31, at 89 (“Expropriation is the most severe 
form of interference with property. All expectations of the investor are destroyed in case the 
investment is taken without adequate compensation.”). 
 207. Muchlinski, supra note 123, at 1035–36. 
 208. DUGAN ET AL., supra note 27, at 483. 
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“prompt, adequate, and effective” compensation.209 This principle 
became “the presumptive standard for modern expropriation 
compensation.”210 During the twentieth century, the United States 
went so far as to refuse to sign any investment treaty that did not 
incorporate the Hull Formula.211 Expropriation remains among the 
most common allegations in ICSID jurisprudence.212  
An initial motivation for developed states to both enter into 
BITs and consent to ICSID arbitration involved providing protection 
for investors against expropriation, especially in light of 
nationalizations following decolonization and throughout the Cold 
War.213 Decolonization motivated foreign investment participants to 
consider treaties because “newly independent states were fiercely 
protective of their independence.”214 These states also feared that 
foreign investment would allow former colonizers to reassert 
control.215 Socialist states that expropriated private industry equally 
affected foreign investment, and in 1974, developing and socialist 
countries provoked the United Nations General Assembly “to 
establish recognition of their right to expropriate foreign 
investment.”216 A fear of expropriation without compensation drove 
developed countries to enter into the earliest BITs.217 
Assumptions grounded in outdated ideologies of the post-
colonial period and Cold War are no longer rational bases for 
investment laws. These obsolete assumptions remain the basis of the 
international investment system in the form of BITs. Although these 
BITs may reap greater profits and larger damages in disputes for 
 
 209. David L. Gunton, Note, Liability Begins at Home: An Alternative Compensation 
Scheme for NAFTA Expropriations, 40 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 219, 225 (2007). 
 210. Id. at 226. 
 211. Vandevelde, supra note 37, at 171. 
 212. See, e.g., Técnicas Medioambientales S.A. v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, 
May 29, 2003, 19 ICSID (W. Bank) 158, ¶¶ 114–16 (2004) (evaluating formalities of 
expropriation); Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/97/1, Aug. 30, 2000, 5 
ICSID (W. Bank) 209, ¶¶ 102–04 (2002) (finding indirect expropriation under NAFTA Chapter 
11 after Mexico declared conservation measures). 
 213. See, e.g., DUGAN ET AL., supra note 27, at 436 (discussing petroleum concession 
seizures). 
 214. Vandevelde, supra note 37, at 166. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. at 167. 
 217. Id. at 168. 
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corporations, they do so at the expense of host state taxpayers218 and 
sustainable development. Whereas it is rational for private investors 
to seek higher financial incentives,219 particularly in the short term, 
private investors can benefit in the long-term if host states are 
permitted to regulate in matters relating to the environment and 
public health. If the labor force within a host state becomes healthier, 
investors may be able to reap greater productivity in the long run.220 
Certain perverse incentives within the international investment 
system have grown apparent, even to the strongest supporters of 
international investment treaties and investor-state disputes.221 In 
addition to a race to the bottom among developing states to 
incentivize foreign investment, the possibility of liability under the 
present international investment system may discourage states from 
enacting legitimate regulations. 
As these perverse incentives within the international investment 
system have become apparent, even to developed states, changes 
proposed by developing states in comprehensive, multilateral 
investment agreement negotiations appear increasingly appropriate.222 
Although the traditional motivations for the international investment 
system bolster a private investor’s profits, the failure to incorporate 
evolving attitudes of the international community into the legal 
framework could strip ICSID of its adherents and render private 
investors’ international legal framework less potent. 
Arbitral awards have also shifted toward this line of reasoning, 
particularly with respect to the matter of expropriation. In Feldman v. 
Mexico,223 the tribunal’s reasoning reflected this transition, stating 
that, “In the past, confiscatory taxation, denial of access to 
infrastructure or necessary raw materials, imposition of unreasonable 
regulatory regimes, among others, have been considered to be 
expropriatory actions. . . . Reasonable governmental regulation of this 
 
 218. See T. Leigh Anenson, Defining State Responsibility Under NAFTA Chapter Eleven: 
Measures “Relating to” Foreign Investors, 45 VA. J. INT’L L. 675, 677 (2005) (“If the corporation 
wins, the taxpayers of the ‘losing’ NAFTA nation must pay the bill.”). 
 219. See Fry, supra note 60, at 112 (“It certainly is not a crime for investors to want the best 
deal possible.”). 
 220. Id. at 112–13. 
 221. See supra notes 190–203 and accompanying text. 
 222. See supra Part II. 
 223. Feldman v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, Dec. 16, 2002, 18 ICSID (W. 
Bank) 488 (2003). 
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type cannot be achieved if any business that is adversely affected may 
seek compensation . . . .”224 
Another tribunal, in LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentina,225 
adopted a balancing test to determine the legitimacy of state 
regulation.226 The test balances “the degree of the measure’s 
interference with the right of ownership and the power of the State to 
adopt its policies.”227 In announcing the test, the tribunal followed 
Técnicas Medioambientales S.A. v. Mexico (Tecmed)228 and 
considered the proportionality of a state’s actions compared to its 
effect on the public interest.229 
These cases stand in sharp contrast to an ICSID award rendered 
only a few years earlier, which prioritized investor claims at the 
expense of state interests. In 2000, an ICSID tribunal explained that, 
“[e]xpropriatory environmental measures—no matter how laudable 
and beneficial to society as a whole—are, in this respect, similar to 
any other expropriatory measures that a state may take in order to 
implement its policies: where property is expropriated . . . the state’s 
obligation to pay compensation remains.”230 This strong language 
appears to encourage investors to bring claims, even minor ones, 
when states enact regulations that could result in even the slightest 
harm. 
In their more recent cases, however, ICSID panels have shifted 
toward firmer protection of state regulatory interests. A provision 
modeled after Article XX of GATT, therefore, would not be 
inconsistent with recent ICSID jurisprudence.231 In fact, the provision 
would not necessarily alter ICSID awards, particularly in light of the 
 
 224. Id. ¶ 103. The arbitral award in Methanex v. United States, Aug. 3, 2005, 44 I.L.M. 1345 
(2005), is widely recognized for deciding that a California ban on gasoline additives was a 
legitimate regulation after a Canadian company filed a NAFTA claim. Id. ¶ 102. 
 225. LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Oct. 3, 2006, 46 I.L.M. 
36 (2007) (decision on liability). 
 226. Id. ¶ 189. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Técnicas Medioambientales, TECMED S.A. v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/00/2, May 29, 2003, 19 ICSID (W. Bank) 158 (2004). 
 229. LG&E Energy Corp., 46 I.L.M. 36, ¶ 195. 
 230. Santa Elena v. Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB/96/1, Feb. 17, 2000, 5 ICSID (W. 
Bank) 153, 192. 
 231. See Reinisch, supra note 204, at 437 (describing instances in which investment dispute 
panels found state regulatory activity permissible). ICSID awards do not represent binding 
authority for future claims, but they do provide persuasive support and tribunals do draw upon 
previous awards. Gottwald, supra note 49, at 256. ICSID has, however, been criticized for 
inconsistent decisions. Id. at 259–60. 
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cases discussed above. Even without an Article XX–type provision, 
arbitral panels interpreting regulations and following revised BITs 
could reasonably arrive at the same result without a formal 
amendment. Although the legal system has the potential to arrive at 
this result organically, developing countries and critics of the investor-
state dispute system may be unaware of informal shifts in the 
jurisprudence of ICSID that might benefit them. After all, the ICSID 
tribunals’ validations of regulatory activity discussed above occurred 
before Bolivia and Ecuador repudiated the ICSID Convention in full 
or in part.232 
Incorporating an exception for state regulation relating to 
environmental, public health, and labor standards into the ICSID 
Convention would provide a means by which state interests might be 
better balanced against those of private investors. Such a provision 
might also deter private investors from bringing frivolous claims 
before ICSID. It has already been noted that trade disputes are 
increasingly framed as investment disputes233 for the attractive, 
enforceable234 damages that have been awarded through the investor-
state dispute process.235 
In sum, the provision advanced in this Note would reduce the 
effect of anachronistic assumptions that persist in investor-state 
arbitration and underlying treaties. The ICSID Convention would 
better reflect contemporary standards and expectations, enhancing 
ICSID’s popularity among developed and developing countries alike. 
CONCLUSION 
Developed and developing states may not have interests that are 
at odds with one another to the extent that some commentators 
perceive. By taking a relatively small step toward a formal 
compromise, using an amendment to the ICSID Convention, 
developed and developing states may be able to sit down at the 
negotiating table in the future to identify an effective framework for 
international investment law. This approach would provide an 
alternative method for reaching an agreement in an area in which 
negotiations appear perpetually blocked. 
 
 232. See supra notes 83–86 and accompanying text. 
 233. Anenson, supra note 218, at 732. 
 234. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
 235. Unlike investor-state disputes, trade cases before the WTO are subject to specific 
performance remedies. DiMascio & Pauwelyn, supra note 163, at 48. 
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Amending the ICSID Convention to allow ICSID tribunals to 
consider environmental and social concerns in their evaluation of 
investor-state disputes would recognize interests that are traditionally 
underrecognized in this area of law. This addition would be consistent 
with evolving standards in the area of international investment law 
and would enhance ICSID’s legitimacy. Acknowledging this trend is 
key as investors bring an increasing number of claims before ICSID 
and as some member states grow dissatisfied with ICSID rules. 
The innovation of ICSID tribunals—namely, granting a right of 
action for investors—provides an alternative remedy for private 
parties. This innovation represents an increasingly sophisticated 
international legal system that addresses global economic challenges. 
Acting in a manner that is overly sympathetic to investor interests in 
the short term could easily translate into long-term harm if states, 
particularly developed ones, become disinterested in ICSID 
participation. Creating an exception modeled after the GATT Article 
XX General Exceptions would address developed and developing 
states’ concerns and ensure ICSID’s continued success as an 
institution that provides solutions for complex legal questions 
associated with global commerce. Simultaneously, this exception may 
advance the multilateral investment agreement project beyond the 
recurring disagreements that have barred its culmination and 
ultimately pave the way toward a workable, comprehensive global 
investment treaty. 
